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Abstract—The free access to large-scale public databases,
together with the fast progress of deep learning techniques,
in particular Generative Adversarial Networks, have led to the
generation of very realistic fake content with its corresponding
implications towards society in this era of fake news.
This survey provides a thorough review of techniques for
manipulating face images including DeepFake methods, and
methods to detect such manipulations. In particular, four types
of facial manipulation are reviewed: i) entire face synthesis, ii)
identity swap (DeepFakes), iii) attribute manipulation, and iv)
expression swap. For each manipulation group, we provide details
regarding manipulation techniques, existing public databases,
and key benchmarks for technology evaluation of fake detection
methods, including a summary of results from those evaluations.
Among all the aspects discussed in the survey, we pay special
attention to the latest generation of DeepFakes, highlighting its
improvements and challenges for fake detection.
In addition to the survey information, we also discuss open
issues and future trends that should be considered to advance in
the field.
Index Terms—Fake News, DeepFakes, Media Forensics, Face
Manipulation, Face Recognition, Biometrics, Databases, Bench-
mark
I. INTRODUCTION
FAKE images and videos including facial informationgenerated by digital manipulation, in particular with
DeepFake methods [1], have become a great public concern
recently [2], [3]. The very popular term “DeepFake” is referred
to a deep learning based technique able to create fake videos
by swapping the face of a person by the face of another
person. This term was originated after a Reddit user named
“deepfakes” claimed in late 2017 to have developed a machine
learning algorithm that helped him to transpose celebrity faces
into porn videos [4]. In addition to fake pornography, some
of the more harmful usages of such fake content include fake
news, hoaxes, and financial fraud. As a result, the area of
research traditionally dedicated to general media forensics [5]–
[11], is being invigorated and is now dedicating growing ef-
forts for detecting facial manipulation in image and video [12].
Part of these renewed efforts in fake face detection are built
around past research in biometric anti-spoofing [13]–[15] and
modern data-driven deep learning [16], [17]. The growing
interest in fake face detection is demonstrated through the
increasing number of workshops in top conferences [18]–
[22], international projects such as MediFor funded by the
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), and
competitions such as the recent Media Forensics Challenge
(MFC2018)1 and the Deepfake Detection Challenge (DFDC)2
launched by the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) and Facebook, respectively.
Traditionally, the number and realism of facial manipula-
tions have been limited by the lack of sophisticated editing
tools, the domain expertise required, and the complex and
time-consuming process involved. For example, an early work
in this topic [23] was able to modify the lip motion of a person
speaking using a different audio track, by making connections
between the sounds of the audio track and the shape of the
subject’s face. However, from these early works up to date,
many things have rapidly evolved in the last years. Nowadays,
it is becoming increasingly easy to automatically synthesise
non-existent faces or manipulate a real face of one person in an
image/video, thanks to: i) the accessibility to large-scale public
data, and ii) the evolution of deep learning techniques that
eliminate many manual editing steps such as Autoencoders
(AE) and Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [24], [25].
As a result, open software and mobile application such as
ZAO3 and FaceApp4 have been released opening the door
to anyone to create fake images and videos, without any
experience in the field needed.
In response to those increasingly sophisticated and realistic
manipulated content, large efforts are being carried out by
the research community to design improved methods for face
manipulation detection. Traditional fake detection methods in
media forensics have been commonly based on: i) in-camera
fingerprints, the analysis of the intrinsic fingerprints introduced
by the camera device, both hardware and software, such as
the optical lens [27], colour filter array and interpolation [28],
[29], and compression [30], [31], among others, and ii) out-
camera fingerprints, the analysis of the external fingerprints
introduced by editing software, such as copy-paste or copy-
move different elements of the image [32], [33], reduce the
frame rate in a video [34], [35], etc. However, most of
the features considered in traditional fake detection methods
are highly dependent on the specific training scenario, being
therefore not robust against unseen conditions [6], [8], [16].
This is of special importance in the era we live in as most
media fake content is usually shared on social networks, whose
platforms automatically modify the original image/video, for
example, through compression and resize operations [12].
1https://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/media-forensics-challenge-2018
2https://deepfakedetectionchallenge.ai/
3https://apps.apple.com/cn/app/id1465199127
4https://apps.apple.com/gb/app/faceapp-ai-face-editor/id1180884341
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Fig. 1. Real and fake examples of each facial manipulation group. For Entire Face Synthesis, real images are extracted from http://www.whichfaceisreal.com/ and
fake images from https://thispersondoesnotexist.com. For Identity Swap, face images are extracted from Celeb-DF database [26]. For Attribute Manipulation,
real images are extracted from http://www.whichfaceisreal.com/ and fake images are generated using FaceApp. Finally, for Expression Swap, images are
extracted from FaceForensics++ [12].
This survey provides an in-depth review of digital manip-
ulation techniques applied to facial content due to the large
number of possible harmful applications, e.g., the generation
of fake news that would provide misinformation in political
elections and security threats [36], [37]. Specifically, we cover
four types of manipulations: i) entire face synthesis, ii) identity
swap, iii) attribute manipulation, and iv) expression swap.
These four main types of face manipulation are well estab-
lished by the research community, receiving most attention in
the last few years. Besides, we also review in this survey some
other challenging and dangerous face manipulation techniques
that are not so popular yet like face morphing.
Finally, for completeness, we would like to highlight other
recent surveys in the field. In [38], the authors cover the
topic of DeepFakes from a general perspective, proposing the
R.E.A.L framework to manage DeepFake risks. In addition,
Verdoliva has recently surveyed in [39] traditional manipu-
lation and fake detection approaches considered in general
media forensics, and also the latest deep learning techniques.
The present survey complements [38] and [39] with a more
detailed review of each facial manipulation group, including
manipulation techniques, existing public databases, and key
benchmarks for technology evaluation of fake detection meth-
ods, including a summary of results from those evaluations.
In addition, we pay special attention to the latest generation
of DeepFakes, highlighting its improvements and challenges
for fake detection.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. We
first provide in Sec. II a general description of different types
of facial manipulation. Then, from Sec. III to Sec. VI we
describe the key a pects of each type of facial manipulation
including public databases for research, detection methods,
and benchmark results. Sec. VII focuses on other interesting
types of face manipulation techniques not covered in previous
sections. Finally, we provide in Sec. VIII our concluding
remarks, highlighting open issues and future trends.
3II. TYPES OF FACIAL MANIPULATIONS
Facial manipulations can be categorised in four main dif-
ferent groups regarding the level of manipulation. Fig. 1
graphically summarises each facial manipulation group. A
description of each of them is provided below, from higher
to lower level of manipulation:
• Entire Face Synthesis: this manipulation creates entire
non-existent face images, usually through powerful GAN,
e.g., through the recent StyleGAN approach proposed
in [40]. These techniques achieve astonishing results,
generating high-quality facial images with a high level
of realism. Fig. 1 shows some examples for entire face
synthesis generated using StyleGAN5. This manipulation
could benefit many different sectors such as the video
game and 3D-modelling industries, but it could also be
used for harmful applications such as the creation of
very realistic fake profiles in social networks in order
to generate misinformation.
• Identity Swap: this manipulation consists of replacing
the face of one person in a video with the face of another
person. Two different approaches are usually considered:
i) classical computer graphics-based techniques such as
FaceSwap6, and ii) novel deep learning techniques known
as DeepFakes7, e.g., the recent ZAO mobile application.
Very realistic videos of this type of manipulation can be
seen on Youtube8. This type of manipulation could benefit
many different sectors, in particular the film industry.
However, in the other side, it could also be used for bad
purposes such as the creation of celebrity pornographic
videos, hoaxes, and financial fraud, among many others.
• Attribute Manipulation: this manipulation, also known
as face editing or face retouching, consists of modifying
some attributes of the face such as the colour of the hair
or the skin, the gender, the age, adding glasses, etc [41].
This manipulation process is usually carried out through
GAN such as the StarGAN approach proposed in [42].
One example of this type of manipulation is the popular
FaceApp mobile application. Consumers could use this
technology to try on a broad range of products such as
cosmetics and makeup, glasses, or hairstyles in a virtual
environment.
• Expression Swap: this manipulation, also known as face
reenactment, consists of modifying the facial expression
of the person. Although different manipulation techniques
are proposed in the literature, e.g., at image level through
popular GAN architectures [43], in this group we focus
on the most popular techniques Face2Face and Neural-
Textures [44], [45], which replaces the facial expression
of one person in a video with the facial expression of
another person. This type of manipulation could be used
with serious consequences, e.g., the popular video of
Mark Zuckerberg saying things he never said9.
5https://thispersondoesnotexist.com
6https://github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap
7https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap
8https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UlvoEW7l5rs
9https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48607673
TABLE I
ENTIRE FACE SYNTHESIS: PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATABASES.
Database Real Images Fake Images
100K-Generated-Images (2019)
[40] - 100,000 (StyleGAN)
100K-Faces (2019)
[46] - 100,000 (StyleGAN)
DFFD (2019)
[17] -
100,000 (StyleGAN)
200,000 (ProGAN)
iFakeFaceDB (2019)
[16] -
250,000 (StyleGAN)
80,000 (ProGAN)
III. ENTIRE FACE SYNTHESIS
A. Manipulation Techniques and Public Databases
This manipulation creates entire non-existent face images.
Table I summarises the main publicly available databases for
research focused on the entire face synthesis. Four different
databases of fake images are of relevance here, all of them
based on the same GAN architectures: ProGAN [47] and
StyleGAN [40]. It is interesting to remark that each fake
image may be characterised by a specific GAN fingerprint just
like natural images are identified by a device-based fingerprint
(i.e., PRNU). In fact, these fingerprints seem to be dependent
not only of the GAN architecture, but also of the different
instances of it [48], [49].
In addition, as indicated in Table I, it is important to note
that the four mentioned databases only contain fake images
generated using the GAN architectures discussed. In order
to perform fake detection experiments on this manipulation
group, researchers need to obtain real face images from other
public databases such as CelebA [50], FFHQ [40], CASIA-
WebFace [51], and VGGFace2 [52], among others.
We provide next a description of each public database.
In [40], Karras et al. released a set of 100,000 synthetic
face images, named 100K-Generated-Images10. This database
was generated using their proposed StyleGAN architecture,
which was trained using the FFHQ dataset [40]. StyleGAN
is an improved version of their previous popular approach
ProGAN, which introduced a new training methodology based
on improving both generator and discriminator progressively.
StyleGAN proposes an alternative generator architecture that
leads to an automatically learned, unsupervised separation of
high-level attributes (e.g., pose and identity when trained on
human faces) and stochastic variation in the generated images
(e.g., freckles, hair), and it enables intuitive, scale-specific
control of the synthesis.
Another public database is 100K-Faces [46]. This database
contains 100,000 synthetic images generated using Style-
GAN. In this database, contrary to the 100K-Generated-
Images database, the StyleGAN network was trained using
around 29,000 photos from 69 different models, considering
face images from a more controlled scenario (e.g., with a
flat background). Thus, no strange artifacts created by the
StyleGAN are included in the background of the images.
10https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan
4(a) Fake (b) Fake after GANprintR
Fig. 2. Examples of a fake image created using StyleGAN and its improved
version after removing the GAN-fingerprint information with GANprintR [16].
Recently, Dang et al. introduced in [17] a new database
named Diverse Fake Face Dataset (DFFD). Regarding the
entire face synthesis manipulation, the authors created 100,000
and 200,000 fake images through the pre-trained ProGAN and
StyleGAN models, respectively.
Finally, Neves et al. presented in [16] the iFakeFaceDB
database. This database comprises 250,000 and 80,000 syn-
thetic face images created with StyleGAN and ProGAN,
respectively. As an additional feature in comparison to pre-
vious databases, and in order to hinder fake detectors, in this
database the fingerprints produced by the GAN architectures
were removed through an approach named GANprintR (GAN
fingerprint Removal), while keeping very realistic appearance.
Fig. 2 shows an example of a fake image directly generated
with StyleGAN and its improved version after removing the
GAN-fingerprint information. As a result of the GANprintR
step, iFakeFaceDB presents a higher challenge for advanced
fake detectors compared with the other databases.
B. Manipulation Detection
Different studies have recently evaluated the difficulty of
detecting whether faces are real of artificially generated.
Table II shows a comparison of the most relevant approaches
in this area. For each study, we include information related
to the method, classifiers, best performance, and databases
considered. We highlight in bold the best results achieved for
each public database. It is important to remark that in some
cases, different evaluation metrics are considered, e.g., Area
Under the Curve (AUC) or Equal Error Rate (EER), which
complicates the comparison among the studies.
Some authors propose to analyse the internal GAN pipeline
in order to detect different artifacts between real and fake
images. In [53], the authors hypothesised that the colour
is markedly different between real camera images and fake
synthesis images. They proposed a detection system based on
colour features and a linear Support Vector Machine (SVM)
for the final classification, achieving a final 70.0% AUC for the
best performance when evaluating with the NIST MFC2018
dataset [58].
Another interesting approach in this line was proposed
in [54]. Wang et al. conjectured that monitoring neuron
behavior could also serve as an asset in detecting fake faces
since layer-by-layer neuron activation patterns may capture
more subtle features that are important for the facial ma-
nipulation detection system. Their proposed approach, named
FakeSpoter, extracted as features neuron coverage behaviors of
real and fake faces from deep face recognition systems (i.e.,
VGG-Face [59], OpenFace [60], and FaceNet [61]), and then
trained a SVM for the final classification. The authors tested
their proposed approach using real faces from CelebA-HQ [47]
and FFHQ [40] databases and synthetic faces created through
InterFaceGAN [62] and StyleGAN [40], achieving for the best
performance a final 84.7% fake detection accuracy using the
FaceNet model.
Fake detection systems inspired in steganalysis have also
been studied. Nataraj et al. proposed in [55] a detection
system based on a combination of pixel co-occurrence ma-
trices and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). Their pro-
posed approach was initially tested through a database of
various objects and scenes created through CycleGAN [63].
Besides, the authors performed an interesting analysis to see
the robustness of the proposed approach against fake images
created through different GAN architectures (CycleGAN vs.
StarGAN), with good generalisation results. This detection
approach was implemented later on in [16] considering images
from the 100K-Faces database, achieving an EER of 12.3% for
the best fake detection performance. This result is remarked
in italics in Table II to indicate that it was not provided in the
original paper.
Many studies have also focused on the detection of the spe-
cial fingerprints inserted by GAN architectures using pure deep
learning methods. Yu et al. proposed in [56] an attribution net-
work architecture to map an input image to its corresponding
fingerprint image. Therefore, they learned a model fingerprint
for each source (each GAN instance plus the real world), such
that the correlation index between one image fingerprint and
each model fingerprint serves as softmax logit for classifica-
tion. Their proposed approach was tested using real faces from
CelebA database [50] and synthetic faces created through dif-
ferent GAN approaches (ProGAN [47], SNGAN [64], Cramer-
GAN [65], and MMDGAN [66]), achieving a final 99.5% fake
detection accuracy for the best performance. However, this
approach seemed not to be very robust against unseen simple
image perturbation attacks such as noise, blur, cropping or
compression, unless the models were re-trained again.
Related to the unseen conditions just commented, Marra et
al. performed in [57] an interesting study in order to detect
unseen types of fake generated data. Concretely, they proposed
a multi-task incremental learning detection method in order
to detect and classify new types of GAN generated images,
without worsening the performance on the previous ones.
Two different solutions regarding the position of the classifier
were proposed based on the successful algorithm iCaRL for
incremental learning [67]: i) Multi-Task MultiClassifier (MT-
MC), and ii) Multi-Task Single Classifier (MT-SC). Regarding
the experimental framework, five different GAN approaches
were considered in the study, CycleGAN [63], ProGAN [47],
Glow [68], StarGAN [42], and StyleGAN [40]. Their proposed
detection approach, based on the XceptionNet model, achieved
promising results being able to correctly detect new GAN
generated images.
Attention mechanisms have also been applied to further
improve the training process of the detection systems. Dang
5TABLE II
ENTIRE FACE SYNTHESIS: COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT STATE-OF-THE-ART DETECTION APPROACHES. THE BEST RESULTS ACHIEVED FOR EACH
PUBLIC DATABASE ARE REMARKED IN BOLD. RESULTS IN italics INDICATE THAT THEY WERE NOT PROVIDED IN THE ORIGINAL WORK.
AUC = AREA UNDER THE CURVE, ACC. = ACCURACY, EER = EQUAL ERROR RATE.
Study Method Classifiers Best Performance Databases (Generation)
McCloskey and Albright (2018)
[53] GAN-Pipeline Features SVM AUC = 70.0% NIST MFC2018
Wang et al. (2019)
[54] GAN-Pipeline Features SVM Acc. = 84.7%
Own
(InterFaceGAN, StyleGAN)
Nataraj et al. (2019)
[55] Steganalysis Features CNN EER = 12.3% [16] 100K-Faces (StyleGAN)
Yu et al. (2019)
[56] Deep Learning Features CNN Acc. = 99.5%
Own
(ProGAN, SNGAN,
CramerGAN, MMDGAN)
Marra et al. (2019)
[57] Deep Learning Features CNN + Incremental Learning Acc. = 99.3%
Own
(CycleGAN, ProGAN,
Glow, StarGAN, StyleGAN)
Dang et al. (2019)
[17] Deep Learning Features CNN + Attention Mechanism
AUC = 100%
EER = 0.1% DFFD (ProGAN, StyleGAN)
Neves et al. (2019)
[16] Deep Learning Features CNN
EER = 0.3% 100K-Faces (StyleGAN)
EER = 4.5% iFakeFaceDB
et al. carried out in [17] a complete analysis of different
types of facial manipulations. They proposed to use attention
mechanisms and popular CNN models such as Xception-
Net and VGG16. For the entire face synthesis manipulation,
the authors achieved a final 100% AUC and around 0.1%
EER considering real faces from CelebA [50], FFHQ [40],
and FaceForensics++ [12] databases and fake images created
through ProGAN [47] and StyleGAN [40] approaches. The
impressive results achieved show the importance of novel
attention mechanisms [69].
Neves et al. performed in [16] an in-depth experimental
assessment of this type of facial manipulation considering
different state-of-the-art detection systems and experimental
conditions, i.e., controlled and in-the-wild scenarios. Four
different fake databases were considered: i) 150,000 fake faces
collected online11 and based on StyleGAN architecture, ii)
the 100K-faces public database, iii) 80,000 synthetic faces
generated using ProGAN, and iv) the iFakeFaceDB database,
an improved version of previous fake databases in which
the GAN-fingerprint information has been removed using the
GANprintR approach. In controlled scenarios, they achieved
similar results as the best previous studies (EER = 0.02%).
However, in more challenging scenarios in which images
(real and fake) come from different sources (mismatch of
datasets), a high degradation of the fake detection performance
is observed. Finally, the results achieved over their public
iFakeFaceDB database with an EER = 4.5% for the best fake
detectors remark how challenging is iFakeFaceDB even for
the most advanced manipulation detection methods. Related to
this enhanced fake content, Cozzolino et al. proposed in [70]
a similar approach based on GAN to inject camera traces into
synthetic images to spoof state-of-the-art fake detectors.
Finally, we also include for completeness some important
references to other recent studies focused on the detection of
general GAN-based image manipulations, not facial ones. In
particular, we refer the reader to [71], [72].
11https://thispersondoesnotexist.com
IV. IDENTITY SWAP
A. Manipulation Techniques and Public Databases
This is one of the most popular face manipulation research
lines nowadays due to the great public concerns around
DeepFakes [2], [3]. It consists of replacing the face of one
person in a video with the face of another person. Unlike
the entire face synthesis manipulation, where manipulations
are carried out at image level, in identity swap the goal is to
generate realistic fake videos.
Since publicly available fake databases such as the UADFV
database [73], up to the recent Celeb-DF and DFDC
databases [26], [74], many visual improvements have been
carried out, increasing the realism of fake videos. As a result,
identity swap databases can be divided into two different
generations. Table III summarises the main details of each
public database, grouped in each generation. As can be seen,
in this type of facial manipulation both real and fake videos
are usually included in the databases.
In this section, we first provide the main details of each
database, to finally summarise at a higher level the key
differences among the two generations.
Three different databases are grouped in the first generation.
UADFV was one of the first public databases [73]. This
database comprises 49 real videos from Youtube, which were
used to create 49 fake videos through the FakeApp mobile
application12, swapping in all of them the original face with
the face of Nicolas Cage. Therefore, only one identity is
considered in all fake videos. Each video represents one
individual, with a typical resolution of 294×500 pixels, and
11.14 seconds on average.
Korshunov and Marcel introduced in [1] the Deepfake-
TIMIT database. This database comprises 620 fake videos of
32 subjects from the VidTIMIT database [75]. Fake videos
were created using the public GAN-based face-swapping al-
gorithm13. In that approach, the generative network is adopted
12https://www.malavida.com/en/soft/fakeapp/
13https://github.com/shaoanlu/faceswap-GAN
6TABLE III
IDENTITY SWAP: PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATABASES.
1st Generation
Database Real Videos Fake Videos
UADFV (2018)
[73] 49 (Youtube) 49 (FakeApp)
DeepfakeTIMIT (2018)
[1] - 620 (faceswap-GAN)
FaceForensics++ (2019)
[12] 1,000 (Youtube)
1,000 (FaceSwap)
1,000 (DeepFake)
2nd Generation
Database Real Videos Fake Videos
DeepFakeDetection (2019)
[77] 363 (Actors) 3,068 (DeepFake)
Celeb-DF (2019)
[26] 890 (Youtube) 5,639 (DeepFake)
DFDC Preview (2019)
[74] 1,131 (Actors) 4,119 (Unknown)
from CycleGAN [63], using the weights of FaceNet [61]. The
method Multi-Task Cascaded Convolution Networks is used
for more stable detections and reliable face alignment [76].
Besides, the Kalman filter is also considered to smooth the
bounding box positions over frames and eliminate jitter on
the swapped face. Regarding the scenarios considered in
DeepfakeTIMIT, two different qualities are considered: i) low
quality (LQ) with images of 64×64 pixels, and ii) high quality
(HQ) with images of 128×128 pixels. Additionally, different
blending techniques were applied to the fake videos regarding
the quality level.
One of the most popular databases in this type of facial
manipulation is FaceForensics++ [12]. This database was
introduced early 2019 as an extension of the original Face-
Forensics database [78], which was focused only on expression
swap. FaceForensics++ contains 1000 real videos extracted
from Youtube. Regarding the identity swap fake videos, they
were generated using both computer graphics and DeepFake
approaches (i.e., learning approach). For the computer graph-
ics approach, the authors considered the publicly available
FaceSwap algorithm14 whereas for the DeepFake approach,
fake videos were created through the DeepFake FaceSwap
GitHub implementation15. The FaceSwap approach consists
of face alignment, Gauss Newton optimization and image
blending to swap the face of the source person to the target
person. The DeepFake approach, as indicated in [12], is based
on two autoencoders with a shared encoder that are trained
to reconstruct training images of the source and the target
face, respectively. A face detector is used to crop and to
align the images. To create a fake image, the trained encoder
and decoder of the source face are applied to the target
face. The autoencoder output is then blended with the rest of
the image using Poisson image editing [79]. Regarding the
figures of the FaceForensics++ database, 1000 fake videos
were generated for each approach. Later on, a new dataset
named DeepFakeDetection, grouped inside the 2nd generation
due to its higher realism, was included in the FaceForensics++
14https://github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap
15https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap
framework with the support of Google [77]. This dataset
comprises 363 real videos from 28 paid actors in 16 different
scenes. Additionally, 3068 fake videos are included in the
dataset based on DeepFake FaceSwap GitHub implementation.
It is important to remark that for both FaceForensics++ and
DeepFakeDetection databases different levels of video quality
are considered, in particular: i) RAW (original quality), ii) HQ
(constant rate quantization parameter equal to 23), and iii) LQ
(constant rate quantization parameter equal to 40). This aspect
simulates the video processing techniques usually applied in
social networks.
Regarding the databases included in the 2nd generation, we
highlight the recent Celeb-DF and DFDC databases released
at the end of 2019. Li et al. presented in [26] the Celeb-
DF database. This database aims to provide fake videos of
better visual qualities, similar to the popular videos that are
shared on the Internet16, in comparison to previous databases
that exhibit low visual quality with many visible artifacts.
Celeb-DF consists of 890 real videos extracted from Youtube,
and 5,639 fake videos, which were created through a refined
version of a public DeepFake generation algorithm, improving
aspects such as the low resolution of the synthesised faces and
colour inconsistencies.
Facebook in collaboration with other companies and aca-
demic institutions such as Microsoft, Amazon, and the MIT
launched at the end of 2019 a new challenge named the Deep-
fake Detection Challenge (DFDC) [74]. They first released a
preview dataset consisting of 1,131 real videos from 66 paid
actors, and 4,119 fake videos. Fake videos were generated
using two different unknown approaches. The complete DFDC
dataset was released later and comprises over 470 GB of
content (real and fake)17.
Finally, to conclude this section, we discuss at a higher level
the key differences among fake databases from the 1st and 2nd
generations. In general, fake videos from the 1st generation are
characterised by: i) low-quality synthesised faces, ii) different
colour contrast among the synthesised fake mask and the skin
of the original face, iii) visible boundaries of the fake mask,
iv) visible facial elements from the original video, v) low
pose variations, and vi) strange artifacts among sequential
frames. Also, they usually consider controlled scenarios in
terms of camera position and light conditions. Many of these
aspects have been successfully improved in databases of the
2nd generation, not only at visual level, but also in terms
of variability (in-the-wild scenarios). For example, the recent
DFDC database considers different acquisition scenarios (i.e.,
indoors and outdoors), light conditions (i.e., day, night, etc.),
distances from the person to the camera, and pose variations,
among others. Fig. 3 graphically summarises the weaknesses
present in identity swap databases of the 1st generation and
the improvements carried out in the 2nd generation. Finally,
it also interesting to remark the larger number of fake videos
included in the databases of the 2nd generation.
16https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKpH0CKltc73e4wh0 pgL3g
17https://www.kaggle.com/c/deepfake-detection-challenge
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Weaknesses that limit the naturalness and facilitate fake detection
Improvements that augment the naturalness and hinder fake detection
Fig. 3. Graphical representation of the weaknesses present in identity swap databases of the 1st generation and the improvements carried out in the 2nd
generation, not only at visual level, but also in terms of variability (in-the-wild scenarios). Fake images are extracted from: UADFV and FaceForensics++ (1st
generation) [12], [73]; Celeb-DF and DFDC (2nd generation) [26], [74].
8B. Manipulation Detection
The development of novel methods to detect identity swap
manipulations is continuously evolving. Table IV provides
a comparison of the most relevant detection approaches in
this area. For each study we include information related to
the method, classifiers, best performance, and databases for
research. We highlight in bold the best results achieved for
each public database. It is important to remark that in some
cases, different evaluation metrics are considered (e.g., AUC
and EER), which complicates the comparison among studies.
Finally, the results highlighted in italics indicate the gener-
alisation capacity of the detection systems against different
unseen databases, i.e., those databases were not considered
for training. These results have been extracted from [26] and
were not included in the original publications.
The first studies in this area focused on the audio-visual
artifacts existed in the 1st generation of fake videos. Korshunov
and Marcel evaluated in [1] baseline approaches based on the
inconsistencies between lip movements and audio speech, as
well as several variations of image-based systems often used in
biometrics. For the first case, they considered Mel-Frequency
Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) as audio features and distances
between mouth landmarks as visual features. Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) was then used to reduce the dimensional-
ity of the blocks of features, and finally Recurrent Neural Net-
works (RNNs) based on Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) to
detect real of fake videos (based on [91]). For the second case,
they evaluated detection approaches based on: i) raw faces
as features, and ii) image quality measures (IQM) [92]. In
particular, they used a set of 129 features related to measures
like signal to noise ratio, specularity, blurriness, etc. PCA with
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), or SVM were considered
for the final classification. Their proposed detection approach
based on IQM+SVM provided the best results, with a final
3.3% and 8.9% EER for the LQ and HQ scenarios of the
DeepfakeTIMIT database, respectively.
In this line, Matern et al. proposed in [80] fake detection
systems based on relatively simple visual aspects such as eye
colour, missing reflections, and missing details in the eye and
teeth areas. Two different classifiers were considered in this
analysis: i) a logistic regression model, and ii) a Multilayer
Perceptron (MLP) [93]. Their proposed approach was tested
using a private database, achieving a final 85.1% AUC for the
MLP system.
Fake detection systems based on facial expressions and head
movements have also been proposed in the literature. Yang
et al. observes in [81] that some DeepFakes are created by
splicing synthesised face regions into the original image, and
in doing so, introducing errors that can be revealed when
3D head poses are estimated from the face images. Thus,
they performed an study based on the differences between
head poses estimated using a full set of facial landmarks
(68 extracted from DLib [94]) and those in the central face
regions to differentiate DeepFakes from real videos. Once
these features are extracted and normalised (mean and standard
deviation), a SVM is considered for the final classification.
Their proposed approach was originally evaluated with the
UADFV database, achieving a final 89.0% AUC. However,
this pre-trained model (using UADFV database) seems not to
generalise very well to other databases as depicted in Table IV.
Another interesting approach in this line was proposed by
Agarwal and Farid in [82]. They proposed a detection system
based on both facial expressions and head movements. For the
feature extraction, the OpenFace2 toolkit was considered [95],
obtaining an intensity and occurrence for 18 different facial
action units related to movements of facial muscles such as
cheek raiser, nose wrinkle, mouth stretch, etc. Additionally,
four features related to head movements were considered. As a
result, each 10-second video clip is reduced to a feature vector
of dimension 190 using the Pearson correlation to measure
the linearity between features. Finally, the authors considered
a SVM for the final classification. Regarding the experimen-
tal framework, the authors built their own database based
on videos downloaded from YouTube of persons of interest
talking in a formal setting, for example, weekly address, news
interview, and public speech. In most videos the person is
primarily facing towards the camera. Regarding the DeepFake
videos, the authors trained one GAN per person based on
faceswap-GAN18. Their proposed approach achieved a final
96.3% AUC as the best fake detection performance, being
robust against new contexts and manipulation techniques.
Another interesting research line is based on the detection
of the artifacts included by the face manipulation pipeline.
In [83], Li and Lyu hypothesised that some DeepFake algo-
rithms can only create images of limited resolution, which
need to be further warped to match the original faces in the
source video. Such transforms leave distinctive artifacts in
the resulting DeepFake videos. Thus, the authors proposed
a detection system based on CNNs in order to detect the
presence of such artifacts from the detected face regions
and the surrounding areas. Four different CNN models were
trained from scratch: VGG16 [96], ResNet50, ResNet101, and
ResNet152 [97]. Their proposed detection approach was tested
using the UADFV and DeepfakeTIMIT databases, outperform-
ing the state of the art for those databases.
Li et al. proposed later on in [26] an improved version of
the work presented in [83]. In this case, the authors included
a new spatial pyramid pooling module to better handle the
variations in the resolution [98]. This detection approach was
evaluated using different databases, achieving state-of-the-art
results in some of them.
Approaches based on mesoscopic and steganalysis features
have also been proposed in the literature. Afchar et al. pro-
posed in [84] two different networks composed of few layers
in order to focus on the mesoscopic properties of the images: i)
a CNN network comprised of 4 convolutional layers followed
by a fully-connected layer (Meso-4), and ii) a modification
of Meso-4 consisted of a variant of the Inception module
introduced in [99], named MesoInception-4. Their proposed
approach was originally tested against DeepFakes using a
private database, achieving a 98.4% of fake detection accuracy
for the best performance. That pre-trained detection model was
tested against unseen databases in [26], proving to be a robust
18https://github.com/shaoanlu/faceswap-GAN
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IDENTITY SWAP: COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT STATE-OF-THE-ART DETECTION APPROACHES. THE BEST RESULTS ACHIEVED FOR EACH PUBLIC
DATABASE ARE REMARKED IN BOLD. RESULTS IN italics INDICATE THAT THEY WERE PUBLISHED IN [26], BUT NOT IN THE ORIGINAL WORK. FF++ =
FACEFORENSICS++, AUC = AREA UNDER THE CURVE, ACC. = ACCURACY, EER = EQUAL ERROR RATE.
Study Method Classifiers Best Performance Databases
Korshunov and Marcel (2018)
[1] Audio-Visual Features
PCA+RNN
PCA+LDA, SVM
EER = 3.3%
EER = 8.9%
DeepfakeTIMIT (LQ)
DeepfakeTIMIT (HQ)
Matern et al. (2019)
[80] Visual Features
Logistic Regression
MLP
AUC = 85.1% Own
AUC = 70.2% UADFV
AUC = 77.0%
AUC = 77.3%
DeepfakeTIMIT (LQ)
DeepfakeTIMIT (HQ)
AUC = 78.0% FF++ / DFD
AUC = 66.2% DFDC Preview
AUC = 55.1% Celeb-DF
Yang et al. (2019)
[81] Head Pose Features SVM
AUC = 89.0% UADFV
AUC = 55.1%
AUC = 53.2%
DeepfakeTIMIT (LQ)
DeepfakeTIMIT (HQ)
AUC = 47.3% FF++ / DFD
AUC = 55.9% DFDC Preview
AUC = 54.6% Celeb-DF
Agarwal and Farid (2019)
[82] Head Pose and Facial Features SVM AUC = 96.3% Own (FaceSwap, HQ)
Li et al. (2019)
[26], [83] Face Warping Features CNN
AUC = 97.7% UADFV
AUC = 99.9%
AUC = 99.7%
DeepfakeTIMIT (LQ)
DeepfakeTIMIT (HQ)
AUC = 93.0% FF++ / DFD
AUC = 75.5% DFDC Preview
AUC = 64.6% Celeb-DF
Afchar et al. (2018)
[84] Mesoscopic Features CNN
Acc. = 98.4% Own
AUC = 84.3% UADFV
AUC = 87.8%
AUC = 68.4%
DeepfakeTIMIT (LQ)
DeepfakeTIMIT (HQ)
Acc. ' 90.0%
Acc. ' 94.0%
Acc. ' 98.0%
FF++ (DeepFake, LQ)
FF++ (DeepFake, HQ)
FF++ (DeepFake, RAW)
Acc. ' 83.0%
Acc. ' 93.0%
Acc. ' 96.0%
FF++ (FaceSwap, LQ)
FF++ (FaceSwap, HQ)
FF++ (FaceSwap, RAW)
AUC = 75.3% DFDC Preview
AUC = 54.8% Celeb-DF
Zhou et al. (2018)
[85]
Steganalysis Features
+
Deep Learning Features
CNN
SVM
AUC = 85.1% UADFV
AUC = 83.5%
AUC = 73.5%
DeepfakeTIMIT (LQ)
DeepfakeTIMIT (HQ)
AUC = 70.1% FF++ / DFD
AUC = 61.4% DFDC Preview
AUC = 53.8% Celeb-DF
Ro¨ssler et al. (2019)
[12]
Mesoscopic Features
Steganalysis Features
Deep Learning Features
CNN
Acc. ' 94.0%
Acc. ' 98.0%
Acc. ' 100.0%
FF++ (DeepFake, LQ)
FF++ (DeepFake, HQ)
FF++ (DeepFake, RAW)
Acc. ' 93.0%
Acc. ' 97.0%
Acc. ' 99.0%
FF++ (FaceSwap, LQ)
FF++ (FaceSwap, HQ)
FF++ (FaceSwap, RAW)
Nguyen et al. (2019)
[86] Deep Learning Features AE + Multi-Task Learning
AUC = 65.8% UADFV
AUC = 62.2%
AUC = 55.3%
DeepfakeTIMIT (LQ)
DeepfakeTIMIT (HQ)
AUC = 76.3% FF++ / DFD
EER = 15.1% FF++ (FaceSwap, HQ)
AUC = 53.6% DFDC Preview
AUC = 54.3% Celeb-DF
Nguyen et al. (2019)
[87] Deep Learning Features Capsule Networks
AUC = 61.3% UADFV
AUC = 78.4%
AUC = 74.4%
DeepfakeTIMIT (LQ)
DeepfakeTIMIT (HQ)
AUC = 96.6% FF++ / DFD
AUC = 53.3% DFDC Preview
AUC = 57.5% Celeb-DF
Dang et al. (2019)
[17] Deep Learning Features CNN + Attention Mechanism
AUC = 99.4%
EER = 3.1% DFFD
Dolhansky et al. (2019)
[74] Deep Learning Features CNN
Precision = 93.0%
Recall = 8.4% DFDC Preview
Gu¨era and Delp (2018)
[88] Image + Temporal Features CNN + RNN Acc. = 97.1% Own
Sabir et al. (2019)
[89] Image + Temporal Features CNN + RNN
AUC = 96.9%
AUC = 96.3%
FF++ (DeepFake, LQ)
FF++ (FaceSwap, LQ)
Tolosana et al. (2020)
[90] Facial Regions Features CNN
AUC = 100.0% UADFV
AUC = 99.4% FF++ (FaceSwap, HQ)
AUC = 91.0% DFDC Preview
AUC = 83.6% Celeb-DF
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approach in some cases such as with the FaceForensics++
database.
Zhou et al. proposed a two-stream network for face ma-
nipulation detection. In particular, the authors considered a
fusion of two streams: i) a face classification stream based on
the CNN GoogLeNet [99] to detect whether a face image is
fake or not, and ii) a path triplet stream that is trained using
steganalysis features of images patches with a triplet loss, and
a SVM for the classification. The initial system was trained to
detect expression swap manipulations. Nevertheless, Li et al.
evaluated in [26] the generalisation capacity of the pre-trained
model (trained using SwapMe app) to detect identity swap
manipulations, resulting to be one the most robust approaches
against the recent Celeb-DF database [26].
An exhaustive analysis of different fake detection methods
was carried out by Ro¨ssler et al. using FaceForensics++
database [12]. Five different detection systems were eval-
uated: i) a CNN-based system trained through handcrafted
steganalysis features [100], ii) a CNN-based system whose
convolution layers are specifically designed to suppress the
high-level content of the image [101], iii) a CNN-based system
with a global pooling layer that computes four statistics
(mean, variance, maximum, and minimum) [102], iv) the
CNN MesoInception-4 detection system described in [84],
and finally v) the CNN-based system XceptionNet [103] pre-
trained using ImageNet database [104] and re-trained for the
face manipulation detection task. In general, the detection
system based on XceptionNet architecture provided the best
results in both types of manipulation methods, DeepFakes and
FaceSwap. In addition, the detection systems were evaluated
considering different video quality levels in order to simulate
the video processing of many social networks. In this real
scenario, the accuracy of all detection systems decreased when
lowering the video quality, remarking how challenging is this
task in real scenarios.
Recent deep learning methods considered in computer vi-
sion have been applied to further improve the detection of
identity swap manipulations. In [86], Nguyen et al. proposed
a CNN system that uses multi-task learning to simultane-
ously detect fake videos and locate the manipulated regions.
They considered a detection system based on an autoencoder.
Concretely, they proposed to use a Y-shaped decoder in
order to share valuable information between the classification,
segmentation, and reconstruction tasks, improving the overall
performance by reducing the loss. Their proposed approach
was evaluated with the FaceSwap manipulation method for the
FaceForensics++ database [78], achieving a best performance
of 15.07% EER, far from other detection approaches. In
addition, this model seems not to generalise very well for other
databases, with results below 80% AUC.
Later on, the same authors presented in [87] a new fake
detection system based on the recent Capsule Networks.
This approach uses fewer parameters than traditional CNN
with similar performance [105]–[107]. The proposed detec-
tion system was originally evaluated using FaceForensics++
database with accuracies higher than 90%. The same pre-
trained detection model was tested against unseen databases
in [26], showing poor generalisation results, as it happens in
most fake detection systems.
Attention mechanisms have also been applied to further
improve the training process of the detection systems. Dang et
al. performed in [17] a thorough analysis of different face ma-
nipulations. They proposed a detection system based on CNN
and attention mechanisms to process and improve the feature
maps of the classifier model. Their proposed attention map
can be implemented easily and inserted into existing backbone
networks, through the inclusion of a single convolution layer,
its associated loss functions, and masking the subsequent high-
dimensional features. Their proposed detection approach was
tested with the DFFD database (based on a combination of the
previous FaceForensics++ databases and a collection of videos
from the Internet). In particular, for identity swap detection,
their proposed approach achieved an AUC of 99.43% and EER
of 3.1%. Despite of the fact that it is difficult to provide a fair
comparison among studies as different experimental protocols
are considered, it is clear that their detection approach provides
state-of-the-art results.
In [74], in addition to the description of the DFDC database,
the authors provided baseline results using three simple detec-
tion systems: i) a small CNN model composed of 6 convo-
lution layers and 1 fully-connected layer to detect low-level
image manipulations, ii) an XceptionNet model trained using
only face images, and iii) an XceptionNet model trained using
the full image. The detection system based on XceptionNet,
considering only the face image (not the full image), provided
the best results with 93.0% precision and 8.4% recall.
Detection systems based not only on features at image level,
but also at temporal level, along the frames of the video, have
also been studied in the literature. Gu¨era and Delp proposed
in [88] a temporal-aware pipeline to automatically detect
fake videos. They considered a combination of CNNs and
RNNs. For the CNN, the authors used InceptionV3 [108] pre-
trained using ImageNet database [104]. For the RNN system,
they considered a LSTM model composed of one hidden
layer with 2048 memory blocks. Finally, two fully-connected
layers were included, providing the probabilities of the frame
sequence being either real or fake. Their proposed approach
was evaluated using a proprietary database with a final 97.1%
accuracy.
In this line, Sabir et al. proposed a method to detect fake
videos based on using the temporal information present in
the stream [89]. The intuition behind this model is to exploit
temporal discrepancies across frames. Thus, they considered a
recurrent convolutional network similar to [88], trained in this
study end-to-end instead of using a pre-trained model. Their
proposed detection approach was tested through FaceForen-
sics++ database, achieving AUC results of 96.9% and 96.3%
for the DeepFake and FaceSwap methods, respectively. Only
the low-quality videos were considered in the analysis.
Finally, the discriminative power of each facial region for
the detection of fake videos was studied in [90]. The authors
considered a fake detection system based on XceptionNet.
Databases from both 1st and 2nd generations were considered
in the experimental framework, concluding that poor fake
detection results are achieved in the latest DeepFake video
databases of the 2nd generation compared with the 1st gener-
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ation, with results of 91.0% and 83.6% AUC for the DFDC
Preview and Celeb-DF databases, respectively. It is important
to highlight that, contrary to [26], a separate fake detection
system was specifically trained for each database.
In conclusion, although many different approaches have
been proposed in the literature, they all show poor generalisa-
tion results to unseen databases, as indicated in Table IV. In
addition, we also highlight the poor detection results achieved
by most approaches on the DeepFake databases of the 2nd
generation with results below 60% AUC.
V. ATTRIBUTE MANIPULATION
A. Manipulation Techniques and Public Databases
This face manipulation consists of modifying in an image
some attributes of the face such as the colour of the hair or
the skin, the gender, the age, adding glasses, etc. Despite
the success of GAN-based frameworks for general image
translations and manipulations [42], [63], [109]–[113], and in
particular for face attribute manipulations [42], [43], [114]–
[119], few databases are publicly available for research in this
area, to the best of our knowledge. The main reason is that
the code of most GAN approaches are publicly available, so
researchers can easily generate their own fake databases as
they like. Therefore, this section aims to highlight the latest
GAN approaches in the field, from older to closer in time,
providing also the link to their corresponding codes.
In [114], the authors introduced the Invertible Conditional
GAN (IcGAN)19 for complex image editing as the union of an
encoder used jointly with a conditional GAN (cGAN) [120].
This approach provides accurate results in terms of attribute
manipulation. However, it seriously changes the face identity
of the person.
Lample et al. proposed in [117] an encoder-decoder archi-
tecture that is trained to reconstruct images by disentangling
the salient information of the image and the attribute values
directly in the latent space20. However, as it happens with the
IcGAN approach, the generated images may lack some details
or present unexpected distortions.
An enhanced approach named StarGAN21 was proposed
in [42]. Before the StarGAN approach, many studies had
shown promising results in image-to-image translations for
two domains in general. However, few studies had focused on
handling more than two domains. In that case a direct approach
would be to build different models independently for every pair
of image domains. StarGAN proposed a novel approach able
to perform image-to-image translations for multiple domains
using only a single model. The authors trained a conditional
attribute transfer network via attribute classification loss and
cycle consistency loss. Good visual results were achieved
compared with previous approaches. However, it sometimes
includes undesired modifications from the input face image
such as the colour of the skin.
19https://github.com/Guim3/IcGAN
20https://github.com/facebookresearch/FaderNetworks
21https://github.com/yunjey/stargan/blob/master/README.md
Almost at the same time He et al. proposed in [119]
attGAN22, a novel approach that removes the strict attribute-
independent constraint from the latent representation, and just
applies the attribute-classification constraint to the generated
image to guarantee the correct change of the attributes.
AttGAN provides state-of-the-art results on realistic attribute
manipulation with other facial details well preserved.
One of the latest approaches proposed in the literature is
STGAN23 [43]. In general, attribute manipulation can be tack-
led by incorporating an encoder-decoder or GAN. However,
as commented Liu et al. [43], the bottleneck layer in the
encoder-decoder usually provides blurry and low quality ma-
nipulation results. To improve this, the authors presented and
incorporated selective transfer units with an encoder-decoder
for simultaneously improving the attribute manipulation ability
and the image quality. As a result, STGAN has recently
outperformed the state of the art in attribute manipulation.
Despite of the fact that the code of most attribute ma-
nipulation approaches are publicly available, the lack of
public databases and experimental protocols results crucial
when comparing among different manipulation detection ap-
proaches. Otherwise, it is not possible to perform a fair
comparison among studies. Up to now, to the best of our
knowledge, the DFFD database [17] seems to be the only
public database that considers this type of facial manipulations.
This database comprises 18,416 and 79,960 fake images gener-
ated through FaceApp and StarGAN approaches, respectively.
B. Manipulation Detection
Attribute manipulations have been originally studied in the
field of face recognition in order to see how robust biometric
systems are against physical factors such as plastic surgery,
cosmetics, makeup or occlusions [127]–[131]. However, it
has been the recent success of mobile applications such
as FaceApp that has motivated the research community to
detect digital face attribute manipulations. Table V provides
a comparison of the most relevant approaches in this area.
We include for each study information related to the method,
classifiers, best performance, and databases for research.
Some authors propose to analyse the internal GAN pipeline
to detect different artifacts between real and manipulated
images. Similar to the entire face synthesis manipulations,
Wang et al. conjectured in [54] that monitoring neuron be-
havior could also serve as an asset in detecting fake faces
since layer-by-layer neuron activation patterns may capture
more subtle features that are important for the facial ma-
nipulation detection system. Their proposed approach, named
FakeSpoter, extracted as features neuron coverage behaviors
of real and fake faces from deep face recognition systems
(VGG-Face [59], OpenFace [60], and FaceNet [61]), and then
trained a SVM for the final classification. The authors tested
their proposed approach using real faces from CelebA-HQ [47]
and FFHQ [40] databases and synthetic faces created through
InterFaceGAN [62] and StyleGAN [40], achieving for the best
22https://github.com/LynnHo/AttGAN-Tensorflow
23https://github.com/csmliu/STGAN
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TABLE V
ATTRIBUTE MANIPULATION: COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT STATE-OF-THE-ART DETECTION APPROACHES. THE BEST RESULTS ACHIEVED FOR EACH
PUBLIC DATABASE ARE REMARKED IN BOLD. AUC = AREA UNDER THE CURVE, ACC. = ACCURACY, EER = EQUAL ERROR RATE.
Study Method Classifiers Best Performance Databases (Generation)
Wang et al. (2019)
[54] GAN-Pipeline Features SVM Acc. = 84.7%
Own
(InterFaceGAN/StyleGAN)
Nataraj et al. (2019)
[55] Steganalysis Features CNN Acc. = 99.4%
Own
(StarGAN/CycleGAN)
Bharati et al. (2016)
[121]
Deep Learning Features
(Face Patches) RBM
Overall Acc. = 96.2%
Overall Acc. = 87.1%
Own
(Celebrity Retouching,
ND-IIITD Retouching)
Jain et al. (2019)
[122]
Deep Learning Features
(Face Patches) CNN + SVM
Overall Acc. = 99.6%
Overall Acc. = 99.7%
Own
(ND-IIITD Retouching,
StarGAN)
Tariq et al. (2018)
[123] Deep Learning Features CNN
AUC = 99.9%
AUC = 74.9%
Own
(ProGAN,
Adobe Photoshop)
Dang et al. (2019)
[17] Deep Learning Features CNN + Attention Mechanism
AUC = 99.9%
EER = 1.0% DFFD (FaceApp/StarGAN)
Wang et al. (2019)
[124] Deep Learning Features DRN AP = 99.8%
Own
(Adobe Photoshop)
Marra et al. (2019)
[57] Deep Learning Features CNN + Incremental Learning Acc. = 99.3%
Own
(Glow/StarGAN )
Zhang et al. (2019)
[125] Spectrum Domain Features GAN Discriminator Acc. = 100%
Own
(StarGAN/CycleGAN)
Rathgeb et al. (2020)
[126] PRNU Features Score-Level Fusion EER = 13.7%
Own
(5 Public Apps)
performance a final 84.7% manipulation detection accuracy
using the FaceNet model.
Fake detection systems inspired in steganalysis have also
been studied. As described in Sec. III-B for the entire face
synthesis, Nataraj et al. proposed in [55] a detection system
based on the combination of pixel co-occurrence matrices and
CNN. They created a new fake dataset based on attribute ma-
nipulations using the StarGAN approach [42] trained through
the CelebA database [50], achieving a final 99.4% accuracy
for the best result.
Many studies have also focused on pure deep learning
methods, either feeding the networks with face patches or
with the complete face. In [121], Bharati et al. proposed
a deep learning approach based on a Restricted Boltzmann
Machine (RBM) in order to detect digital retouching of face
images. The input of the detection system consisted of face
patches in order to learn discriminative features to classify
each image as original or retouched. Regarding the databases,
the authors generated two fake databases from the original
ND-IIITD database (collection B [132]) and a set of celebrity
facial images downloaded from the Internet. Fake images were
generated using the professional software PortraitPro Studio
Max24, considering aspects such as skin texture, shape of eyes,
nose, lips and overall face, prominence of smile, lip shape,
and eye colour. Their proposed approach achieved overall
accuracies for manipulation detection of 96.2% and 87.1% for
the celebrity and ND-IIITD retouching databases, respectively.
A similar approach based on non-overlapping face patches
was presented in [122]. Jain et al. proposed a CNN feature
24https://www.anthropics.com/portraitpro/
extractor composed of 6 convolutional layers and 2 fully-
connected layers. Additionally, residual connections were con-
sidered inspired by a ResNet architecture [97]. Finally, a SVM
was used for the final classification. Regarding the experimen-
tal framework, the ND-IIITD retouched database presented
in [121] was considered. Additionally, the authors considered
fake images created through the StarGAN approach [42],
trained using the CelebA database [50]. In general, good de-
tection results were achieved in both manipulation approaches,
achieving almost 100% manipulation detection accuracy.
Deep learning methods based on the complete face have
been further studied in the literature, achieving in general very
good results. Tariq et al. evaluated in [123] the use of dif-
ferent CNN architectures such as VGG16 [59], VGG19 [59],
ResNet [97], or XceptionNet [103], among others. For the real
face images, the CelebA database [50] was used. Regarding the
fake images, two different approaches were considered: i) ma-
chine approaches based on GAN, in particular ProGAN [47],
and ii) manual approach based on Adobe Photoshop CS6,
including manipulations such as makeup, glasses, sunglasses,
hair, and hats. For the experimental evaluation, different sizes
of the images were considered (from 32×32 to 256×256
pixels). A final 99.99% AUC was obtained for the machine-
created scenario whereas for the human-created scenario this
value decreased to a final 74.9% AUC for the best CNN
model. Thus, a high degradation of the manipulation detection
performance was observed between machine- and human-
created fake images.
Attention mechanisms have also been applied to further
improve the training process of the detection systems. As
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described in previous sections, Dang et al. developed in [17]
a system able to detect different types of fakes. They used
attention mechanisms to process and improve the feature maps
of CNN models. Regarding the attribute manipulations, two
different approaches were considered: i) fake images created
through the public FaceApp software, with up to 28 different
available filters considering aspects such as hair, age, glasses,
beard, and skin colour, among others; and ii) fake images
created through the StarGAN approach [42], with up to 40
different filters. Their proposed approach was tested using their
novel database DFFD, achieving very good results close to
1.0% EER (and 99.9% of AUC).
Wang et al. carried out in [124] an interesting research
using publicly available commercial software from Adobe
Photoshop (Face-Aware Liquify tool [133]) in order to syn-
thesise new faces, and also a professional artist in order to
manipulate 50 real photographs. The authors began running
a human study through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT),
showing real and fake images to the participants and asking
them to classify each image into one of the classes. The results
achieved remark how challenging the task is for humans, with
a final 53.5% of accuracy, close to chance (50%). After the
human study, the authors proposed two different automatic
models: i) a global classification model based on Dilated
Residual Networks (DRN) to predict whether the face has
been warped or not, and ii) a local warp predictor based on
the optical flow field in order to identify where manipulation
occurs, and reverse them. The PWC-Net approach proposed
in [134] was considered to compute the flow from original
to manipulated and vice versa. Performances of 99.8% and
97.4% for automatic and manual face synthesis manipulation
were achieved.
The work [57] by Marra et al. also described in Sec. III-B
was able to correctly perform discrimination when new GANs
were presented to the network and achieved a 99.3% accuracy
for their proposed manipulation detection approach, based on
the XceptionNet model.
A detection system based on features extracted from the
spectrum domain, rather than the raw image pixels, was
presented by Zhang et al. in [125]. Given an image as input,
they applied a 2D DFT to each of the RGB channels, getting
one frequency image per channel. Regarding the classifier,
they proposed AutoGAN, which is a GAN simulator that
can synthesise GAN artifacts in any image without needing
to access any pre-trained GAN model. The generalisation
capacity of their proposed approach was tested using unseen
GAN models. In particular, StarGAN [42] and GauGAN [110]
were considered in the evaluation. For the StarGAN approach,
good detection results were achieved using the frequency
domain (100%). However, for the GauGAN approach, a high
degradation of the system performance, 50% accuracy, was
observed. The authors claimed that this was produced due to
the generator of the GauGAN is drastically different from the
CycleGAN (used in training).
Finally, Rathgeb et al. proposed in [126] a detection system
based on Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU). Specifi-
cally, scores obtained from the analysis of spatial and spectral
features extracted from PRNU patterns across image cells
were fused. Their proposed approach was evaluated over a
private database created using 5 different mobile applications,
achieving an average 13.7% EER in manipulation detection.
To summarise this section, we can see that the core of
most attribute manipulation detection systems are based on
deep learning technology, providing in general very good
results close to 100% accuracy, as indicated in Table V. This
is mainly produced due to the GAN-fingerprint information
present in fake images. However, as indicated in the entire
face synthesis manipulation, recent studies have been proposed
in the literature to remove such GAN fingerprints from the
fake images while keeping very realistic appearance [16],
[70], which represent a challenge even for the most advanced
manipulation detectors.
VI. EXPRESSION SWAP
A. Manipulation Techniques and Public Databases
This manipulation, also known as face reenactment, consists
of modifying the facial expression of the person. We focus on
the most popular techniques Face2Face and NeuralTextures,
which replace the facial expression of one person in a video
with the facial expression of another person (also in a video).
To the best of our knowledge, the only available database for
research in this area is FaceForensics++ [12], an extension of
FaceForensics [78].
Initially, the FaceForensics database was focused on the
Face2Face approach [44]. This is a computer graphics ap-
proach that transfers the expression of a source video to a
target video while maintaining the identity of the target person.
This was carried out through manual keyframe selection.
Concretely, the first frames of each video were used to obtain
a temporary face identity (i.e., a 3D model), and track the
expression over the remaining frames. Then, fake videos were
generated by transferring the source expression parameters
of each frame (i.e., 76 Blendshape coefficients) to the target
video. Later on, the same authors presented in FaceForen-
sics++ a new learning approach based on NeuralTextures [45].
This is a rendering approach that uses the original video
data to learn a neural texture of the target person, including
a rendering network. In particular, the authors considered
in their implementation a patch-based GAN-loss as used in
Pix2Pix [110]. Only the facial expression corresponding to
the mouth was modified. It is important to remark that all
data is available on the FaceForensics++ GitHub25. In total,
there are 1,000 real videos extracted from Youtube. Regarding
the manipulated videos, 2,000 fake videos are available (1,000
videos for each considered fake approach). In addition, it is
important to highlight that different video quality levels are
considered, in particular: i) RAW (original quality), ii) HQ
(constant rate quantization parameter equal to 23), and iii) LQ
(constant rate quantization parameter equal to 40). This aspect
simulates the video processing techniques usually applied in
social networks.
In addition to the Face2Face and NeuralTexture techniques
considered in expression swap manipulations at video level,
25https://github.com/ondyari/FaceForensics
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TABLE VI
EXPRESSION SWAP: COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT STATE-OF-THE-ART DETECTION APPROACHES. THE BEST RESULTS ACHIEVED FOR EACH PUBLIC
DATABASE ARE REMARKED IN BOLD. FF++ = FACEFORENSICS++, AUC = AREA UNDER THE CURVE, ACC. = ACCURACY, EER = EQUAL ERROR RATE.
Study Method Classifiers Best Performance Databases (Generation)
Matern et al. (2019)
[80] Visual Features Logistic Regression, MLP AUC = 86.6% FF++ (Face2Face, RAW)
Afchar et al. (2018)
[84] Mesoscopic Features CNN
Acc. = 83.2% FF++ (Face2Face, LQ)
Acc. = 93.4% FF++ (Face2Face, HQ)
Acc. = 96.8% FF++ (Face2Face, RAW)
Acc. ' 75% FF++ (NeuralTextures, LQ)
Acc. ' 85% FF++ (NeuralTextures, HQ)
Acc. ' 95% FF++ (NeuralTextures, RAW)
Ro¨ssler et al. (2019)
[12]
Mesoscopic Features
Steganalysis Features
Deep Learning Features
CNN
Acc. ' 91% FF++ (Face2Face, LQ)
Acc. ' 98% FF++ (Face2Face, HQ)
Acc. ' 100% FF++ (Face2Face, RAW)
Acc. ' 81% FF++ (NeuralTextures, LQ)
Acc. ' 93% FF++ (NeuralTextures, HQ)
Acc. ' 99% FF++ (NeuralTextures, RAW)
Nguyen et al. (2019)
[86] Deep Learning Features Autoencoder
EER = 7.1% FF++ (Face2Face, HQ)
EER = 7.8% FF++ (NeuralTextures, HQ)
Dang et al. (2019)
[17] Deep Learning Features CNN + Attention Mechanism
AUC = 99.4%
EER = 3.4% FF++ (Face2Face, -)
Sabir et al. (2019)
[89] Image + Temporal Features CNN + RNN Acc. = 94.3 FF++ (Face2Face, LQ)
Amerini et al. (2019)
[135] Image + Temporal Features CNN + Optical Flow Acc. = 81.6% FF++ (Face2Face, -)
different approaches have been recently proposed to change
the facial expression in both images and videos. A very
popular approach was presented in [136]. Averbuch-Elor et
al. proposed a technique to automatically animate a still
portrait using a video of a different subject, transferring the
expressiveness of the subject of the video to the target portrait.
Unlike Face2Face and NeuralTexture approaches that require
videos from both input and target faces, in [136] just an image
of the target is needed. In this line, a recent approach was
recently presented in [137], providing very good results in
both one-shot and few-shot learning.
Finally, we also highlight other popular approaches at image
level. For example, mobile applications such as FaceApp26
allow to easily change the level of smiling, from happier
to angrier. These approaches are based on current GAN
architectures. For example, Choi et al. showed in [42] the
potential of StarGAN to change an input image to different
expression levels such as angry, happy, neutral, sad, surprised,
and fearful. Other recent GAN approaches that improve both
the image quality of the fake images and the control editing
of the parameters are InterFaceGAN [62], UGAN [138],
STGAN [43], and AttGAN [119].
B. Manipulation Detection
This section aims to provide an overview of the expression
swap detectors at video level using the FaceForensics++
database, as this is the only publicly available database for
research in this area, to the best of our knowledge. Manipu-
lations at image level (not video) can be detected using the
same approaches described in Sec. III-B and V-B.
26https://apps.apple.com/gb/app/faceapp-ai-face-editor/id1180884341
Table VI provides a comparison of the most relevant
approaches in the area of expression swap detection. For
each study we include information related to the method,
classifiers, best performance, and databases. We highlight in
bold the best results achieved for the only public database,
FaceForensics++. It is important to remark that in some cases,
different evaluation metrics are considered (e.g., AUC and
EER), which makes it difficult to perform a fair comparison
among the studies.
Some of the following methods were already discussed in
Sect. IV-B for identity swap detection. Here we summarise
the results achieved by them in detecting expression swap
manipulations.
Preliminary studies have focused on the visual features ex-
isted in fake videos such as the eye colour, missing reflections,
etc. In [80] by Matern et al., the proposed approach was tested
using the FaceForensics++ database, but only the Face2Face
manipulation technique, achieving a final 86.6% AUC for the
best performance.
Approaches based on mesoscopic and steganalysis features
have also been studied in the literature. In [84], the proposed
approach was tested using the Face2Face fake videos from
the FaceForensics++ database [12], achieving in general good
results, especially for RAW-quality videos. The same approach
was later on tested in [12] against NeuralTextures fake videos,
obtaining lower accuracy results compared with the Face2Face
scenario.
Recent deep learning methods have also been applied
with good results. In [12], the detection system based on
XceptionNet provided the best results in both Face2Face and
NeuralTextures manipulations, close to 100% on RAW quality.
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In addition, the detection systems were evaluated considering
different video quality levels in order to simulate the video
processing of many social networks. In this real scenario, the
accuracy of all detection systems was degraded with the video
quality, as it happens in identity swap manipulations.
In [86], the proposed approach based on multi-task learning
was evaluated with the FaceForensics++ database. For the
Face2Face method, a 7.1% EER was achieved on HQ videos
whereas for the NeuralTexture method, the EER increased a
bit more to a final 7.8% EER in manipulation detection.
Attention mechanisms have been recently proposed in [17]
to further improve the training process. The proposed detection
approach was tested using the DFFD database, which for the
expression swap manipulation is based only on data from
FaceForensics++ database. The proposed approach achieved
an AUC = 99.4% and EER = 3.4%.
Another interesting line is based on the analysis of both im-
age and temporal information. In [89], the proposed approach
based on recurrent convolutional networks was tested using the
FaceForensics++ database, achieving AUC results of 94.3%
for the Face2Face technique. Only the low-quality videos were
considered in the analysis. Finally, in [135], Amerini et al.
proposed the adoption of optical flow fields to exploit possible
inter-frame dissimilarities, using the PWC-Net approach [134].
The optical flow is a vector field computed among consecutive
frames to extract apparent motion in the scene. The use of this
approach is motivated as fake videos should have unnatural
optical flow due to the unusual movement of lips, eyes, etc.
Preliminary results were obtained using both VGG16 and
ResNet50 networks, obtaining an Acc. = 81.6% for the best
performance in manipulation detection.
Finally, as stated previously, most of the approaches re-
ported here for expression swap detection have also been
used for identity swap detection as reviewed in Sec. IV-B. In
general, it seems that similar features can be learnt by the fake
detectors to distinguish between real and fake content, achiev-
ing good results in both types of manipulations. We highlight
the potential of novel techniques such as attention mechanisms
to better guide the networks during the training process, as
shown in [17], achieving AUC results of 99.4% for detecting
both identity swap and expression swap manipulations.
VII. OTHER FACE MANIPULATION DIRECTIONS
The four classes of face manipulation techniques described
before are the ones that are receiving most attention in
the last few years, but they do not perfectly represent all
possible face manipulations. This section discusses some other
challenging and dangerous approaches in face manipulation:
face morphing, face de-identification, and face synthesis based
on audio or text (i.e., audio-to-video and text-to-video).
A. Face Morphing
Face morphing is a type of face manipulation that can be
used to create artificial biometric face samples that resemble
the biometric information of two or more individuals [139],
[140]. This means that the new morphed face image would
be successfully verified against facial samples of these two or
more individuals creating a serious threat to face recognition
systems [141], [142]. In this sense, face morphing is a different
type of facial manipulation compared to the four main types
covered in this survey. Also, it is worth noting that face
morphing is mainly focused on creating fake samples at image
level, not video such as identity swap manipulations.
There has been a large amount of research in the field of
face morphing recently [143]–[147]. A very complete review
of this field has been published by Scherhag et al. [140] in
2019 including both morphing techniques and also morphing
attack detection. The authors state that even though the large
amount of publications, the research in this field is still in
its infancy, with many open issues and challenges such us
generating high-quality morphed images, the lack of publicly
available large-scale databases or benchmarks, the lack of
metrics for reporting the vulnerability of face recognition
systems to morphing attacks, etc. Very recently, in [148] a
thorough evaluation of differential morphing attack detection
has been carried out including the application of deep face
representations.
B. Face De-Identification
The main aim of face de-identification (de-ID) is to remove
the identity information present on a face image or video
in order to preserve the privacy of the person [149]. This
can be achieved in several ways. The simplest way can be
just to obfuscate the face by blurring or pixelation (e.g., in
Google Maps Street View). More sophisticated methods try to
provide face images with different identities but maintaining
all other factors (pose, expression, illumination, etc.) unaltered.
Therefore, the concept of face de-ID is very general. One
possible option to achieve face de-identification could be
through face identity swap.
Earlier works in this area were based on applying face de-
ID to still images. In [150] Gross et al. presented a multi-
factor framework for de-ID, which combined linear, bilinear,
and quadratic models. They showed their method was able to
protect privacy while preserving data utility on an expression-
variant face database. More recently, the developments of
image synthesis methods based on deep neural networks, in
particular GAN, have inspired new face de-ID methods such
as [151], [152], which uses synthesised faces to replace the
original ones. Also, in [153], the authors proposed the use
of Semi-Adversarial Networks (SAN) to confound arbitrary
face-based gender classifiers.
Recently, in [154] Gafni et al. presented in 2019 a method
that provides face de-ID with convincing performance even in
unconstrained videos. Their approach is based on an adversar-
ial autoencoder coupled with a trained face classifier. This way
they can achieve a rich latent space, embedding both identity
and expression information. Also, in [155] a new face de-
ID method based on a deep transfer model was presented.
This method treats the non-identity related facial attributes
as the style of the original faces, and uses a trained facial
attribute transfer model to extract and map them to different
faces achieving very promising results both in single images
and videos.
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Some other related studies in this area work directly over
face representations or deep face models by eliminating there
undesired or protected information like identity, gender, or
facial expressions [156]–[158]. Once that protected informa-
tion has been disentangled, a face image or video can then
be generated based on the new representations originated in
which the protected information has been eliminated, reduced,
or obfuscated.
C. Audio-to-Video and Text-to-Video
A related topic to facial expression swap is the synthesis
of video from audio or text. These types of video face
manipulations are also known as lip-sinc deep fakes [159].
Regarding the synthesis of fake videos from audio (audio-
to-video), Suwajanakorn et al. presented in [109] an approach
to synthesise high quality videos of a person (Obama in this
case) speaking with accurate lip sync. For this, they used
as input to their approach many hours of previous videos
of the person together with a new audio recording. In their
approach they employed a recurrent neural network (based
on LSTMs) to learn the mapping from raw audio features to
mouth shapes. Then, based on the mouth shape at each frame,
they synthesised high quality mouth texture, and composited
it with 3D pose matching to create the new video to match
the input audio track, producing photorealistic results. In [160],
Song et al. proposed an approach based on a novel conditional
recurrent generation network that incorporates both image and
audio features in the recurrent unit for temporal dependency,
and also a pair of spatial-temporal discriminators for better
image/video quality. As a result, their approach can model
both lip and mouth together with expression and head pose
variations as a whole, achieving much more realistic results.
Also, in [161] Song et al. presented a dynamic method not
assuming a person-specific rendering network like in [109].
In their approach they are able to generate very realistic fake
videos by carrying out a 3D face model reconstruction from
the input video plus a recurrent network to translate the source
audio into expression parameters. Finally, they introduced a
novel video rendering network and a dynamic programming
method to construct a temporally coherent and photo-realistic
video.
Regarding the synthesis of fake videos from text (text-to-
video), in [162] Fried et al. proposed a method that takes as
input a video of a person speaking and the desired text to
be spoken, and synthesises a new video in which the persons
mouth is synchronised with the new words. In particular, their
method automatically annotates an input talking-head video
with phonemes, visemes, 3D face pose and geometry, re-
flectance, expression and scene illumination per frame. Finally,
a recurrent video generation network creates a photorealistic
video that matches the edited transcript.
In [159], Agarwal et al. propose a method to detect
face manipulations based on audio-to-video and text-to-video
by exploiting the fact that the dynamics of the mouth
shape (visemes) are occasionally inconsistent with a spoken
phoneme. They focus on some particular visemes in which
the mouth must be completely closed and observe that this
does not happen in many manipulated videos.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Motivated by the ongoing success of digital face manipu-
lations, specially DeepFakes, this survey provides a compre-
hensive panorama of the field, including details of up-to-date:
i) types of facial manipulations, ii) facial manipulation tech-
niques, iii) public databases for research, and iv) benchmarks
for the detection of each facial manipulation group, including
key results achieved by the most representative manipulation
detection approaches.
Generally speaking, most current face manipulations seem
easy to be detected under controlled scenarios, i.e., when
fake detectors are evaluated in the same conditions they are
trained for. This fact has been demonstrated in most of the
benchmarks included in this survey, achieving very low error
rates in manipulation detection. However, this scenario may
not be very realistic as fake images and videos are usually
shared on social networks, suffering from high variations
such as compression level, resizing, noise, etc. Also, facial
manipulation techniques are continuously improving. These
factors motivate further research on the generalisation ability
of the fake detectors against unseen conditions. This aspect has
been preliminary studied in different works [16], [56], [57].
Fusion techniques, at a feature or score level, could provide
a better adaptation of the fake detectors to the different scenar-
ios [163]–[165]. In fact, different approaches are already based
on the combination of different sources of information, e.g.,
Zhou et al. proposed in [85] a detection system based on the
combination of steganalysis and pure deep learning features,
whereas Rathgeb et al. proposed in [126] the combination of
spatial and spectral features. Besides, fusion of other sources
of information such as the text or the audio that accompanies
the videos when uploading them to social networks could be
very valuable to improve the detectors [166]–[168].
We highlight next the key aspects to improve and future
trends to follow for each facial manipulation group:
• Face Synthesis: current manipulations are usually based
on GAN architectures such as StyleGAN, providing very
realistic images. Nevertheless, most detectors can easily
distinguish between real and fake images, achieving ac-
curacies close to 100%. This is produced due to fake im-
ages are characterised by specific GAN fingerprints. But,
what if we are able to remove those GAN fingerprints
while keeping very realistic synthetic images? Recent
approaches have focused on this research line, which
represents a challenge even for the best manipulation
detection systems [16], [70].
• Identity Swap: although many different approaches have
been proposed in the literature, it is certainly difficult to
decide which is the best one. This is produced due to
many different factors. First, most approaches are trained
for a specific database and compression level, achieving
in general very good results. However, they all show poor
generalisation results to unseen conditions. In addition,
the fact that different metrics (i.e., Acc., AUC, EER, etc.)
and experimental protocols are usually considered does
not help to achieve fair comparisons among studies. All
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these aspects should be further considered to advance in
the field.
Furthermore, we want to highlight the detection results
achieved in the latest DeepFake databases of the 2nd
generation such as DFDC and Celeb-DF [26], [74]. While
fake detectors already achieve AUC results close to 100%
in databases of the 1st generation such as UADFV and
FaceForensics++ [12], [73], they all suffer from a high
performance degradation on the latest ones, in particular
for the Celeb-DF database with AUC results below 60%
in most cases. Therefore, more efforts are needed to fur-
ther improve current fake detection systems, for example,
through large-scale challenges and benchmarks such as
the recent DFDC27.
• Attribute Manipulation: the same aspect highlighted
for the face synthesis (GAN fingerprint removal) also
applies here as most manipulations are based on GAN
architectures. In addition, it is also interesting to remark
the scarcity of public databases for research (only the
DFFD database is publicly available [17]), and the lack
of standard experimental protocols to perform fair com-
parisons among studies.
• Expression Swap: contrary to the identity swap, which
has rapidly evolved with the release of improved Deep-
Fake databases, the only public database in expression
swap is FaceForensics++, to the best of our knowledge.
This database is characterised by visual artifacts that are
easy to detect, achieving therefore AUC results close to
100% in several fake detection approaches. We encourage
researchers to generate and make public more realistic
databases based on recent techniques [109], [136], [161].
All these aspects, together with the development of im-
proved GAN approaches and the recent DeepFake Detection
Challenge (DFDC) will foster the new generation of realistic
fake images/videos [169] together with more advanced tech-
niques for face manipulation detection.
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